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A RBITRATION: TIME LIMITS AND
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
Richard L Bloch*
Time limits in a collective bargaining agreement,1 particularly as
they apply to the grievance procedure, are very important. Filing or
processing deadlines are taken as seriously in the context of these
private documents and negotiated time limits as they are in the
world of standard litigation, with deadlines that are imposed statu
torily or otherwise.

Management advocates often view the time

limitation provisions as virtually the only thing employers gain, as
opposed to give, in the bargaining relationship. Deadlines have
been strictly, if reluctantly, construed by most arbitrators.2
The "continuing violation" provides a meaningful exception to
the otherwise immutable time bar. As the violation continues, so
* A.B. 1965, Dartmouth; J.D. 1968, M.B.A. 1974, University of Michigan. Mr. Bloch is a
labor arbitrator in Washington, D.C. - Ed.

1. The labor agreement normally controls the scope and nature of items that may be
submitted to the dispute resolution process, often ending in binding arbitration. A standard
clause dealing with time limitations might read as follows:
A grievance protesting an alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement
must be filed within ten days of the time the grievant knew, or should have known, of
the event giving rise to the grievance. Failure to file the grievance in a timely manner
will result in its being considered void.
There are cases in which arbitrators have simply ignored time limits, somehow concluding
that a ruling on the merits would benefit the parties, see Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. Airline
Pilots Assn. Intl., 37 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 741 (1961) (Wolff, Arb.), but these cases are
thankfully rare. To be sure, there are cases where the jurisdictional issue is so knotty, arcane
and time consuming, and the central claims in the case are so straightforward and, signifi·
cantly, without merit (one cannot grieve a grievance that is untimely) that the arbitration
may properly bypass the procedural issue as a measure of judicial economy. It should be
recalled, however, that parties may well have agreed to avoid bifurcating the case - arguing
procedure first and merits at a later date - as an economy gesture of their own, with no
thought that they would, by so doing, forego a threshold decision on arbitrability.

2. In Painesville Township Local Schools v. Ohio Assn. of Public School Employees Local
324, 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 333, 336-37 (1997) (Oberdank, Arb.), the arbitrator stated
the majority view:
Arbitrators are reluctant to dismiss disputes on procedural grounds but, as I have said in
the past, time limits are a fact of life in industrial relations and strengthen the bargaining
relationship between the parties by encouraging disputes to be brought fonvard when
they occur and processed in an expeditious fashion. They add finality to the collective
bargaining process by ensuring that the parties will not have to waste time or financial
resources on stale claims. As much as the arbitrator may want to decide issues on the
merits, he must refrain from doing so when the dispute is not timely.
On the other hand, arbitrators will resolve doubts against forfeiture of the right to process
grievances when the labor agreement raises doubts as to the impact of the time limits or
when the evidence shows, for example, a practice of lax enforcement. See City of Wooster v.
Wooster Employees Assn., 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 230, 233-34 (1997) (Shanker, Arb.).
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does the window of opportunity to protest it. The most important
element in recognizing a new violation is the fact that the arbitrator

will not consider the failure to grieve prior breaches fatal to the
claim of one protesting the current actions. But defining what the
continuing violation does is easier than understanding what it is. It
is apparent that the term itself - "continuing violation" - is both
a misnomer and a source of some confusion among the parties and
in the minds of arbitrators as well, and that leads, on occasion, to
conceptual dilemmas and errant results. The purpose of this discus
sion is to highlight the true nature of this very important concept.

An excellent, if divided, view of the continuing violation land
scape, in a nonarbitration context, is provided in

United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Evans.3 A flight attendant hired by United Airlines in 1966
was required to resign in 1968 because she married, breaching the
company's no-marriage rule. The rule was subsequently found to
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.4 In 1972, Ms. Evans was
rehired, but as a new employee. She filed suit under Title VII,
claiming the employer violated the statute by refusing to credit her
with seniority for any period prior to February of 1972. She as
serted that, by denying her seniority back to the starting date of her
original employment, United was perpetuating the effect of past
discrimination. The District Court dismissed her complaint. That
her resignation was a result of an unlawful employment practice
was irrelevant, in the court's judgment, because she had forfeited
her opportunity to address her grievance when she failed to file a
charge within ninety days of the date of her separation.5 The Sev
enth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately reversed that decision.6
The Supreme Court agreed with the District Court that her
claim for seniority was untimely. The Court acknowledged that the
seniority system did give present effect to a past act of discrimina
tion: "United's seniority system does indeed have a continuing im
pact on her pay and fringe benefits."7 But, it said,
the emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical
question is whether any present violation exists. She has not alleged
3. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
4.

See

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).

5. See Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 287
1975), available in 1975 WL 11902.

(N.D.

ill.

6. See Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976). A divided panel of
the court first affirmed the district court decision, Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 12 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 288 (7th Cir. 1976), available in 1976 WL 3803, then after the
Supreme Court decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976),
reheard the case and unanimously reversed, see 534 F.2d at 1248.
7.

United Air Lines,

431 U.S. at 558.
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that the system discriminates against former female employees or that
it treats former employees who are discharged for a discriminatory
reason any differently from former employees who resigned or were
discharged for a non-discriminatory reason. In short, the system is
neutral in its operation.8

In that case, then, the mere fact that a past, admittedly illegal, event
had affected the calculation of seniority credit did not justify the
:finding of a continuing violation. Because the earlier act had not
been challenged in a timely fashion, it maintained no present legal
significance. "A contrary view," said the Court, "would substitute a
claim for seniority credit for almost every claim which is barred by
limitations. "9
Justice Marshall's dissent voiced the mantra that so often leads
to error: "In the instant case, the violation -treating respondent
as a new employee even though she was wrongfully forced to resign
-is continuing to this day."10 This is an example, however, of im
properly mixing a repetition of the offending act with the continua
tion of the effects of the acts. It is a distinction often overlooked.
In the arbitration arena, substantial confusion exists as to when
a violation "continues. "11 In part, for reasons to be discussed, the
misunderstandings flow from the terminology itself -and in part
from the existence of multiple events and an inability to distinguish
between the act, which is grievable, and its effects, which are not.
The inability of arbitrators to understand this distinction causes un
certainty as to proper application of the continuing violation doc
trine. As will be noted, the search for "continuity" can result in a
wild goose chase. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the vital
ity of a grievance depends not on the continuing aspect of the al
leged violation, nor even on its chrome or recurrent nature, but on
the fact that it is a new act. In terms of timeliness considerations,
any relationship to earlier occurrences is likely to be irrelevant.

8. 431 U.S. at 558 (citations omitted).
9. 431 U.S. at 560.
10. 431 U.S. at 561-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11. Parties have even argued a "continuing grievance" theory under the rubric of a con
tinuing violation: Once filed, the argument is posed, a grievance should remain viable for the
purpose of protesting similar actions taken at a later time. See Kroger Co. v. UFCW Local
455, 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 466, 469-70 (1997) (Baroni, Arb.). In that case, the arbitrator
properly rejected the union's assertion that a grievant passed over for a position could use
her grievance in that case to protest a later bypass, because of "continued mistreatment."
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THE "CLASSIC" CASES
The issue can be better understood by examining hypothetical
extremes.12 Consider fri st the case of an employer who, for pay pur

poses, accidentally assigns an employee a lower rate than is properly
paid for his job classification. Thereafter, each pay period, the em
ployee's pay is shorted by ten dollars. Assume further that the collec
tive bargaining agreement provides ten calendar days within which
one must grieve. The grievant does not immediately catch the error,
and thus the grievance is filed after several pay periods have elapsed,
thirty days after the first erroneous paycheck. This type of case is
often cited by arbitrators as a classic example of a continuing viola
tion.13 According to the rationale, each pay period the employee
has suffered another contractual deprivation and therefore ought to
be able to grieve, even beyond the original contractual ten-day
deadline.
At the other end of the spectrum is the individual who is dis
charged. Assume an employee is discharged for misconduct on June

15th. The labor agreement provides a ten-day period within which to
grieve. However, a grievance is not filed until September 15th. As in
the case above, this person argues that the loss of pay each pay
period amounts to a continuing violation. This, however, is the
"classic" example of a case where the violation does not continue.
Few would argue that the September grievance protesting the dis
missal was somehow exempt from timely filing and that it could be
entered into the grievance procedure then or thereafter without
limits. That result would be entirely contrary to the reasons for the
limits in the first place. In this context, the lost paychecks represent
the continuing impact of the act, but do not, in and of themselves,
give rise to new violations or additional filing deadlines. Thus, the
conclusion that the discharged employee is out of time, and out of
luck in terms of filing, is easily understood. To be sure, the grievant
fails to receive a paycheck each and every week. But this is the
result of a single act - discharge - that was fully implemented and
completed some time ago. While the effects of the violation, if it
was one, continue to be felt, the original act cannot now be con12. Throughout this discussion, hypotheticals (as distinguished from cases) will be set
in italics.
13. See, e.g., USS v. United Steelworkers of America Local 1219, 109 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 434 (1997) (Bethel, Arb.); Harding Galesburg Mk.ts., Inc. v. UFCW Local 951, 103
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1158 (1994) (Daniel, Arb.); Titan Wheel Intl. v. International Assn. of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local 2048, 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 514 (1991) (Smith,
Arb.).
forth
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tested, and the lack of a paycheck does not represent a present
violation.
However, these classic examples, and others, deserve closer
scrutiny. In the first case, for example, it is true that an individual
deprived, week after week, of the appropriate pay stipend has a
grievance. Yet, the ability to grieve the violation rests not on the
fact that it has continued, as observed above, but rather on the fact
that it is new. The shorted paycheck in any given week stands as a
new and independent violation. The employee's ability to enter the
grievance procedure in a timely fashion has nothing to do with past
breaches. Nonetheless, depending on the arbitrator's assessment of
whether the grievant sat on his rights too long, there may be ques
tions as to the grievant's ability to collect retroactively.14
Moreover - and here is the real heresy - were it not for the
accidental nature of the pay shortage in the above-cited "classic"
14. Indeed, there conceivably may be a case where a union's acquiescence in a policy
requires a finding not that the complaint is necessarily untimely, but that it fails because the
policy is now accepted through laches on the part of the union. Generally, care must be
taken to distinguish issues of arbitrability from those of remedy and retroactivity. Finding
that a grievance is arbitrable, due to a recurrent violation, does not require the conclusion
that the grievant is entitled to back pay to the beginning of the violations. Consistent with
the notion that the claim is based on a new act so, too, should the remedy be restricted to that
act.
In Harding Galesburg Markets, the arbitrator considered the case of an employer who
had failed to implement the terms of a settlement agreement that would have affected several
employees' wages. There, too, the grievance had been filed outside the existing time limits.
Said the arbitrator:
The contract does, indeed, establish certain restrictions on the filing of grievances but
this particular complaint has the unique aspect of a wage claim which is universally
treated by arbitrators quite differently from ordinary contract disputes. The reason is
that each time an employee receives a paycheck which is less than what is believed to be
the proper amount there is created a right to complain and grieve. If the employee, for
whatever reason, fails to take action within the specified period of time, the right to
complain about that alleged shortage is lost and cannot subsequently be raised. How
ever, each new paycheck constitutes a new opportunity for complaint - it is then a case
of continuing violation and the right to grieve is reactivated regularly as paychecks are
received. Normally, arbitrators would not permit such a grievance to reach back any
further than the immediate paycheck which falls within the filing period. However, this
contract provides that in such an event the back pay liability may extend retroactively to
as much as ninety days prior to the event complained of. In fact, the parties here by
having established such a ninety day period of retroactivity clearly intend such cases to
be an exception to the normal filing period time limitations. For the reasons noted
above the arbitrator finds that this grievance is timely filed and subject to arbitration
though the remedy by way of any back pay would be limited by the contract provision.
Harding Galesburg Mkts., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. {BNA) at 1163. This case and the discussion
cited above highlight the true nature of a continuing violation. The arbitrator focused on the
recurring paychecks as new and independent actions that were, because of their repetition,
subject to a grievance. Significantly, it was not the loss occasioned by the initial action that
supported the finding of a continuing violation. Indeed, the arbitrator noted that "[i]f the
employee, for whatever reason, fails to take action within the specified period of time, the
right to complain about that alleged shortage is lost and cannot subsequently be raised." 103
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1163. Rather, it was the series of new paychecks, each raising a
new shortage issue, that justified the finding of a continuing violation.
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case, this might not be considered a continuing violation at all. The
relevance of the inadvertent deduction is that the grievant may not
have been on notice of the violation until he became aware of the
offending paycheck. But had management formally changed a pol
icy, giving clear notice of its intent to adjust the pay structures, the
existence of a series of diminished checks at a later date should be
irrelevant.15

The "paycheck-as-violation" approach is common

place and, for reasons to be discussed below, often erroneous.
Again, the error is in failing to distinguish between new acts, which
are grievable, and the continuing impact of older acts, which are
not.
In USS

v.

United Steelworkers of America Local 1219,16 the

company began to offset an employee's paycheck on February 10,
1996, deducting certain sickness and accident benefits the employee
thought he was due. The grievance protesting these deductions was
filed in May or June, in either event well after the contractually
mandated thirty-day time limit for grieving. The arbitrator con
cluded that the issuance of the first check applying the offset satis
fied the requirement of company "action" and that the thirty-day
clock had thus begun to run at that point. It was therefore too late
to protest the first offset. The arbitrator, however, found that the
grievant's failure to file within thirty days of that action in no way
prohibited him from protesting other offsets:
As the Company sees it, the initial offset was an "action" that demon
strated the Company's interpretation of Section 10.41. Thus, Griev
ant was required to protest that interpretation within 30 days of the
first offset or be forever barred, at least for the initial period of
disability.
15. In Eaton County Road Commission v. AFSCME Council 25, 110 Lab. L. Rep. {BNA)
(110 Lab. Arb. Rep.) 198 (1997) (Allen, Arb.), the arbitrator found that a notice to subcon
tract "should not always" require the immediate filing of a grievance: "To require the Union
to file a grievance, before any details are known, or before a Special Conference, could result
in premature or needless grievances." 110 Lab. L. Rep. (BNA) (110 Lab. Arb. Rep.) at 202.
The arbitrator suggested in that case that the contents of the notice might determine whether
time limits would be triggered at that point or whether, instead, each day of the subcontract
ing would constitute an additional violation. 110 Lab. L. Rep. (BNA) (110 Lab. Arb. Rep.)
at 202. See also Selkirk Metalbestos v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 456, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1147 (1997) (Amis, Arb.). There the arbitrator found the matter timely when the
union, having received notice of management's intentions, waited for the actual subcontract
ing to begin. Said the arbitrator:
It is often the case that when management notifies the Union of its intentions for future
action, as it did here in January 1996, the Union elects to wait until management acts to
file a grievance. The Union thus has a concrete basis for its grievance rather than a
speculative one. Indeed, where the Union grieves upon being given notice of manage
ment's intent, the Company often will argue that the grievance is premature and that
nothing has happened to justify it.
107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1149.
16. 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 434 (1997) (Bethel, Arb.).
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... But it does not follow that the action of issuing one check with
an offset precludes an employee from contesting subsequent offsets.
After all, each check is an "action" of the Company denying benefits
to the employee. Of course, the failure to grieve a particular offset
within 30 days of that offset will preclude a remedy for that action.
But Grievant is not barred from grieving subsequent offsets. In this
case, then, Grievance 96-046 properly protested offsets made subse
quent to its filing as well as those made within 30 days of the filing.17

This is a textbook example of an arbitral response to the problem,
including the standard - and, I argue here, potentially irrelevant
- reliance on the "paycheck-as-violation" analysis. As will be
noted, focusing solely on the existence of the check is not a suffi
cient answer:

How does one satisfactorily distinguish between

checks that are, in fact, new actions from those that are merely
manifestations of an earlier act? The following hypotheticals and
cases suggest some guidelines.

On January 1, management reviews a particular job, concluding
it is properly paid at a Grade Level Five. The union believes it
should be paid at Level Six, one grade higher. Thereafter, each
paycheck is issued at the lower rate. Each time an employee re
ceives a paycheck that is allegedly deficient, conventional wisdom
suggests a grievance may be filed, as observed earlier. This ap
proach is potentially problematic: May the employee perform the
job for five years, only to claim that a misclassification occurred five
years earlier? Such an outcome is unreasonable: If the job was, in
fact, misranked, it ought to be grieved at the time, rather than hav
ing both parties work under a system that is both inaccurate and
capable of generating further problems in later years with subse
quent job changes.
17. 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. {BNA) at 438. But see Georgia Pac. Corp. v. ILWU Local 6, 110
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) {110 Lab. Arb. Rep.) 269 (1998) (Oestreich, Arb.). In this case, the
company implemented a new incentive pay plan. The union did not grieve implementation
of the plan but waited for the date of the first paycheck, which was well beyond the applica
ble filing time limits. The arbitrator concluded the filing was untimely. The union character
ized the "occurrence of the event causing the grievance," 110 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (110
Lab. Arb. Rep.) at 272, as the first issuance of paycheck, thereby raising the "classic" contin
uing violation argument, 110 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (110 Lab. Arb. Rep.) at 271. The arbitra
tor, however, found the "occurrence" to be the implementation date of the new incentive
plan, considerably earlier. 110 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (110 Lab. Arb. Rep.) at 274. This
arguably aberrant decision can be rationalized in one respect: the arbitrator placed substan
tial emphasis on the wording of the grievance.
To agree with the Union's contention would be inconsistent with the wording of the
[the] Chief Steward . ... To hold otherwise would entirely change the
nature of the grievance filed in this case. If the "event causing the grievance" took place
on [the date of paycheck issuance], we would see a grievance filed on behalf of specific
employees who received a lower gain share payout for the month of March under the
new plan than they would have received under the old plan.

grievance filed by

110 Lab.

Arb. Rep. (BNA) at

274 (emphasis

added).
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On January 1, a bargaining employee is notified her job is to be
discontinued; her employment will be severed, effective immediately.
Consistent with the collective bargaining agreement, she is entitled to
a severance payment that is calculated in accordance with a contrac
tually established formula involving her years of service. The em
ployee is presented with a document that, in her judgment, misapplies
the severance payment formula. The document requests that she elect
whether to receive the payment in a lump sum or in the form of an
annuity, payable monthly over twenty-five years. The employee opts
for the annuity payment. Does this mean she now has twenty-five
years to challenge, monthly, the application of the formula? In this
case, the mere choice of payment form should not serve to modify
the time limits applicable to the grievance. The grievant was ad
vised, on January 1, of all the facts constituting grounds for the
grievance. Had she received the payment in a lump sum on that
date, no one would seriously argue that she could contest the calcu
lation twenty or twenty-five years later. Merely modifying the pay
out format should not have any impact.18

On January 1, the results of a competitive promotion are an
nounced. The grievant is not among those selected and, accordingly,
he fails to qualify for a pay raise. Each paycheck thereafter repre
sents a diminished amount, compared to what he would have re
ceived with the promotion. But that does not provide license to file
a grievance in perpetuity. The act complained of is the issuance of
the promotion list, and notice to the grievant would presumably
have been provided at the time the list was posted. Any other re18. In Allegheny Airlines v. ALPA, No.USX-96-087 {1997) (Bloch et al., Arbs.) (unpub
lished decision on file with author), a pilot informed the company in October 1995 that he
wished to retire, effective immediately. The company denied his request, claiming a lack of
notice. It said, however, he could resign, and he did. At a later date, the pilot sought to
claim his retirement benefits. The company denied him the free pass privileges that normally
would be granted to retiring employees, citing a company regulation requiring pilots to go
directly from active service to retirement. The interim resignation, the company claimed,
should operate to deny his claim. The pilot grieved the lost pass privilege in March 1996, well
beyond the sixty days contractually allowed for filing grievances. Conceding that the griev
ance was filed beyond the sixty-day limit, the union maintained that the denial of the pass
benefits was a continuing violation because the violation of the pilot's retirement benefits
was ongoing. See Allegheny Airlines, No. USX-96-087, slip op. at 3.
The System Board of Adjustment held that the matter was untimely filed:
We do not conclude here that the company's actions in declining the grievant's at
tempt to retire were necessarily proper. That question comprises the merits of this case.
Our decision is limited to the finding that it was the company's actions on October 17,
1995 that precipitated the current dispute. They should have been grieved within the
negotiated 60-day period. . . . While the grievant suffered the loss of pass privileges
because of [the company's October actions], there was no repeated act, standing prohibi
tion . . . or continuing actions by the company thereafter, only the effects of the original
action.
Allegheny Airlines, No. USX-96-087, slip op. at 7-8.
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suit would be manifestly unfair to, among others, the successful job
aspirant who may work in the classification for months or years,
only to find a late-blooming claim that the promotion process was
for naught. The promotion is a one-time, discrete act directed at an
individual, as distinguished from, for example, the setting forth of
general policies that will potentially apply to particular workers in
limited instances.
These hypothetical cases involve clearly defined acts - job clas
sification, severance payment, and promotion - that affect salary,
to be sure, but that are capable of being understood, reviewed, and
challenged at the point they are announced. Other cases, however,
are not as easily defined.
THE "DOUBLE Acr" DILEMMA
Perhaps the most difficult issue conceptually arises in the con
text of management's unilaterally issuing a general policy or work
rule. Parties and arbitrators often believe that, assuming the rule is
somehow unfair - and therefore violative of the just cause require
ment or otherwise contrary to an existing contractual requirement
- its issuance creates a continuing violation situation. Thus, man
agement's edict may be grieved any time it is applied; it is not nec
essary to protest within a certain period following its issuance.
On the one hand, it is not unreasonable to suggest, in the inter
est of certainty and predictability in the industrial relationship, that
management be aware, early on, that the policy it has attempted to
promulgate is contractually offensive. Management may argue with
some justification that, after years of application and with full con
formance to its mandates, the policy should not suddenly be subject
to challenge the first time the employee is disciplined for breaking
its rule. On the other hand, there is merit in the standard rejoinder:
the union should not have to speculate as to the nature of the disci
pline or the impact of the rule. It is by no means unreasonable
simply to await its application to test the integrity of the policy.
These competing demands are accommodated by recalling that,
with rare exception, one premises a finding of timeliness on the
existence of an act that, while possibly repetitive, is nevertheless
new. This means that, in this context, there may be two or more
viable events constituting acts - issuing the policy and enforcing
it.19
19. In Dyncorp Wallops Flight Facility v. International Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers District 74, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1033 (1993) (Jones, Arb.), the company de
clined to discharge an employee who was failing to retain his membership in good standing
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On January 1, management issues a new set of work rules requir
ing, among other things, that employees be "clean shaven- no mus
taches or beards. '120 Two employees are affected by the new rules:
the first has grown a beard and has been threatened with suspension
until he shaves it off. The second has requested permission to grow a
beard but has been denied and told he will be disciplined if he does.
On February 15, the first employee files a grievance contending
the policy is unreasonable, unnecessarily infringing the personal pre
rogatives of otherwise well-groomed employees who either would
like to grow a beard or mustache or keep the one they have. Man
agement objects on the basis of timeliness, citing a ten-day limit.21
The grievant is told he is too late: he, or the union, should have
challenged the rule within ten days of its issuance. Having failed to
do so, the rule must be assumed reasonable and his grievance
nonarbitrable.
An arbitrator would likely make short work of the company's
protest in this case. Even if it were too late to challenge the under
lying rule, the issue of reasonableness may properly be tested as
applied to a disciplinary situation. This is a situation in which an
existing policy may not be challenged, but the discipline may.
To be sure, the end result of challenging the disciplinary event,
as contrasted to the policy underlying it, may be the same. If the
policy is found wanting in circumstances that are broadly applicable
to the workforce, the result of setting aside one employee's disci
pline will be indistinguishable from setting aside the policy. But
this does not change the underlying rationale: To take another ave
nue to contest a particular policy is wholly consistent with the prem
ise that by disciplining, management had engaged in a new act. The
with the union. The arbitrator noted that if, in fact, the labor agreement required the com
pany to discharge the employee when requested by the union, "then every day (or month)
that the Company continues to allow [the employee] to work without rendering to the Union
the required minimum service fees, another occurrence of the aggrieved issue takes place."
101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1036. Here, too, the violation - failing to honor the union
security agreement - was being repeated from day to day, albeit as a result of the em
ployer's inaction rather than action.
20. For some reason, the "hair cases" no longer play as visible a role as they did in the
1960s and 1970s. Perhaps this is a fashion statement. Or perhaps it is simply because this is
the 1990s.
21. Conceivably, management may also claim the grievance is not ripe and therefore not
properly before the arbitrator inasmuch as there has been no discipline meted out for a
breach of the regulation. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Brotherhood of R.R., Airline and
Steamship Clerks, 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 31 (1977) (Bloch et al., Arbs.). As to that issue,
the arbitrator concluded that it was not necessary for an employee actually to subject himself
to discipline in order to test the reasonableness of the rule. 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 33.
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challenged act in this case is the enforcement of the rule; that event
provides the new set of time limits.

The second employee, wishing to grow a beard, also challenges
the rule on February 15. Here, too, management raises a timeliness
objection, contending, once more, that a grievance challenging the
rule should have been registered within the contractual time limits
following issuance of the policy.
There are compelling practical reasons to conclude that,
notwithstanding the need for certainty in the administration and ap
plication of work rules, one should not require an immediate chal
lenge to the issuance of general work rules. A new absenteeism
program, for example - particularly the so-called no-fault pro
grams22 - may incorporate a variety of arcane mechanisms for
counting absences. Assuming, as is often the case, that the program
has not been negotiated with the union, but rather imposed as an
exercise of managerial authority, the union cannot be expected to
have reviewed or discovered each and every potential application
and to have tested it against any existing just-cause requirement.
The union is likely to determine that it makes more sense to test the
rule as applied. Beyond that, it is true that, from the employees'
standpoint, nothing has happened: it is management's action in dis
ciplining or, alternatively, in declining permission to engage in a
certain activity,23 that triggers the time limits as applied to an in
dependent event.
Does this mean an established policy is forever subject to chal
lenge? Do time limits simply not apply to implementation of a pol
icy?

Is the

policy

vulnerable

to

being

overturned,

without

limitation at any time? How does one distinguish between events
that, when repeated, constitute a series of new acts, on the one
hand, and those events that are merely evidence of continuing im
pact, on the other?24 The answer is: It depends on the specific na
ture of the employer policy or plan. One must pay careful attention
22. As distinguished from programs where management scrutinizes each proffered reason
for absence, some employers opt to assume all absences valid, but to charge points in every
instance. Discipline or dismissal follows upon attaining a certain point level.
23. One might properly inquire whether it is always necessary for an employee to incur
discipline for the purpose of testing a rule. Practically speaking, one should not demand that
sort of "test case." The continuing nature of the labor relationship strongly suggests that the
parties should be able to submit jointly such a question for resolution or that, at the least, the
parties should be able to test the issue by means of a formal request for permission that,
when denied, would be grieved. See Northwest Airlines, 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. {BNA).

24. Finding that a grievance is timely, as in the case of a protest to discipline administered
under a long-standing policy, is not a guarantee that the policy will be overturned. Evidence
may well persuade the arbitrator that the policy has been mutually accepted in practice or by
acquiescence.
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to the nature of the act. When management issues a general policy
or work rule, not yet fleshed out through application, it is reason
able to consider the possibility of testing the policy "on its face" at
the time it is issued or, alternatively, to await its actual application
to test it "as applied." An attendance policy, for example, may
have wide applications in a variety of circumstances. A union
should not have to review, for possible challenge, every imaginable
variation and application at the time of issuance. But when the new
policy, pronouncement, or plan is directed to a discrete' event changing an existing pay plan, for example - management has a
strong argument that the act or event is then definable, complete,
and reviewable and that it must, therefore, be grieved at that point.
The argument that subsequent paychecks will have been improp
erly modified will, in such case, be unavailing, for those payments
will be properly regarded as the impact of the act, rather than the
act itself. Consider, in that context, the following cases.
In late 1992, the employer, a wastewater treatment facility, an
nounced a reorganization plan, part of which required that two
Treatment Plant Foreman positions be reclassified as Operators,
lower-rated jobs. The effective date of that reclassification was
February 1, 1993.

Some fifteen months later, in May 1994, the

union concluded that the job to which the grievants had been trans
ferred was improperly classified. It requested that the employer
make the appropriate modifications, but this was denied. AccordIn Larry's Markets v. UFCW Local 1105, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 795 (1995)
(Lehleitner, Arb.), the employer issued a commitment to the neighborhood co=unity that
employees would be prohibited from parking on residential streets. The employer posted the
restriction on August 4, 1994. The grievance protesting the restriction was not filed until six
months later, well beyond the applicable 60-day limitation for filing grievances. 105 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 798-99. The arbitrator found a continuing violation, concluding inter
alia, that "each day that employees are prohibited from parking on City streets, a new, al
leged violation occurs. Stated differently, the facts of this case represent a classic example of
a continuing violation, which is not subject to time limits." 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 799.
This case well reflects the double act syndrome. The act at issue is the existing prohibi
tion on parking. From a purely conceptual standpoint, the prohibition is issued anew each
day: Were an employee to request permission to park, it would be denied. That denial could
be grieved. Yet delay is not necessarily cost-free. That is, a grievant could challenge the cost,
for example, of alternative parking on a given date - and thereby challenge the prospective
vitality of the rule - but likely would be proscribed from seeking retroactive compensation.
Moreover, it is entirely possible an arbitrator would entertain the grievance as timely, but
conclude that, inasmuch as the policy bad been in existence for an extended time, free from
challenge and actually in effect - employees had, in fact, stopped parking in the neighbor
hood - the union must be seen as having acquiesced in the policy.
Such a finding may require evidence as to the particular rule and the nature of its applica
tion. If, for example, the rule has existed but has been essentially dormant, never having
been applied and, therefore, never having been tested, one may conclude there is no reason
to find acquiescence or acceptance by the union. If, on the other hand, the rule has been
routinely enforced, an arbitrator may well find that the union's silence has amounted to ac
quiescence and that, having effectively slept on its rights, it is too late to challenge. -
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ingly, the union grieved in June 1994. The arbitrator concluded
that, as concerns the original reclassification, the matter was un
timely. The union had sufficient knowledge of all relevant facts in
1993 and should have grieved within the applicable ten calendar
days. He found that the later grievance, however, was timely be
cause the misclassification, if any, was a continuing violation.25 Said
the arbitrator:
the grievance can be characterized as "continuing" in the sense that
each day there is a separate occurrence of the act complained of, as
opposed to a single completed event or transaction. In these types of
grievances, arbitrators have not strictly enforced grievance time lim
its, although any remedy awarded typically runs only from the filing
of the grievance.26

The reclassification case is an example where management's ac
tion is clear, well-defined, and, significantly, fully executed upon its
completion. The judgment has been made; there is nothing else to
accomplish. This is not an inchoate act or response awaiting appro
priate circumstances for its application. In this case, if a grievance
protesting the original reclassification is in fact untimely, it makes
little sense to conclude that the same claim should later be consid
ered timely. Surely, this is a situation involving the continuing im
pact of the initial management decision.

To the extent the

arbitrator's decision ignores that fact, it is in error.27
In Titan Wheel International

v.

International Assn. of Machinists

& Aerospace Workers Local 2048,28 the union contended that the
company violated the labor agreement by failing to pay certain clas
sified jobs incentive rates rather than standard hourly rates of pay.
The company argued, among other things, that the union had been
aware of the company's position for some five years and that it had
filed several grievances and withdrawn them. Therefore, the arbi
trator should consider the matter untimely. The arbitrator found
the grievance was of "the continuing type"
in that there is the basis for a grievance each time the employee re
ceives a paycheck. If the positions are not properly classified under
the terms and conditions of the Agreement, then the Company's fail-

25. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 367, 108 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 97 (1997) (Landau, Arb.).
26. 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 99.
27. Nor is it accurate to state that arbitrators somehow apply time limits loosely in the
case of a continuing violation. If, in fact, there has been a recurrent breach, the time limits
apply with complete precision because a new triggering date has been established.
28. 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 514 {1991) (Smith, Arb.).
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ure to properly remunerate. the employee is basis for a grievance as
long as the violation continues.29

Yet if one assumes the company's position as to incentive rates was
clearly announced at the time of its imposition, it is unclear why the
arbitrator should not require a timely challenge at that point. Here,
as in a promotion case, the management action is clearly defined,
identifiable, and complete. It affects pay, to be sure. But the pros
pect of continuing paychecks neither changes the requirement of a
timely protest nor salvages

an

otherwise untimely claim. Once the

time limits have expired, the paychecks are merely the continuing
impact of the uncontested act.3o
In Great Falls Public Schools

v.

International Union of Operat

ing Engineers Local 400,31 two bargaining-unit employees worked
on Memorial Day, 1996. They received holiday pay at the rate of
double the regular hourly rate. The union maintained the employ
ees were entitled to triple time. The parties discussed the issue then
and, indeed, in subsequent contract negotiations thereafter. Ulti
mately, however, they were unable to agree, and the union grieved
the matter on October 11. The parties had established a five-day
limit for filing grievances.32 The arbitrator found the matter arbi
trable. First, he concluded, this was a "union grievance filed on be
half of all the bargaining unit members in

an

attempt to have its

29. 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 519.
30. In Excel Corp. v. UFCW District 540, 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1144 (1977) (Moore,
Arb.), the union grieved the fact that employees in a particular department were being de
nied the opportunity to be paid "gang time" - pay based on work assigned to a particular
department rather than based on the time the employee clocks in and out.
Tue union claimed the failure to pay on the "gang time" system was a violation of the
contract and that each paycheck represented a "continuing violation." Management argued
that the pay system bad been implemented some ten years before and had survived scrutiny
in intervening contract negotiations. It claimed, therefore, that the grievance was untimely.
108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1146. Tue arbitrator concluded that, inasmuch as the manner
of payment to the grievants had been established ten years ago and that the union had had
the opportunity to address the matter during negotiations, it was untimely. 108 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) at 1146-47.
Issues of notice frequently arise in such cases. Most often, work rules and employment
related policies, as distinguished from actual contract revisions, are unilaterally promulgated
instead of bargained. There may well be a question of whether the union was properly ap
prised of the new policy for purposes of ascertaining the triggering moment of the time limits.
In this case, then, it is conceivable that the first pay period might represent such notice,
assuming inadequate notice prior to that time. Given the significance of the time limits,
factual questions of notice are scrutinized carefully.
31. 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 998 (1997) (Calhoun, Arb.).
32. Art. XX sec. 20.1.2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement provided that "[i]f the
matter is not resolved under the preceding provision or if the immediate supervisor fails to
give his answer within the time provided, the aggrieved employee and his representative if
desired shall have five (5) working days to reduce the grievance to writing and present same
to the District." 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 999.
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interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement upheld. "33
"Union grievances," he opined, "are by nature continuing."34 He
also concluded the matter had been filed "in anticipation of what
the unioJ!. had every reason to believe would be a contract violation
as soon as a bargaining unit employee worked a holiday."35 There
is no support for his first conclusion that union grievances are
somehow exempt from time limits. The second rationale reflects
another, more common, misunderstanding.36
If, as is apparently the case, the union was protesting solely the
employer's interpretation of the Holiday Pay provision - first
made apparent on Memorial Day, 1996- the grievance protesting
that interpretation should be considered untimely. Save for the fact
that the Holiday Pay itself was not a consistent paycheck element,
this case is indistinguishable from those in which the management
action was, in fact, fully executed. The payments, then, were the
manifestations of the changed policy and did not give rise to the
type of new event that would generate new time limits.
SUMMARY
Clear and consistent application of time limits benefits all par
ticipants in the collective bargaining relationship. Stale claims are
avoided, there is less chance of festering problems, and as a general
matter, the parties operate with a more current, more precise con
cept of the bargain they have negotiated. The search for "continu
ing violations" must focus on the existence of new and independent
actions that may be claimed as contract violations without regard to
any nexus to past events. In particular, parties must avoid the urge
to treat altered wage payments as a sine qua non for timeliness.
Such events may, indeed, be new, albeit repeated, violations. But
they may also represent nothing more than the impact of a clearly
defined management action that, assuming proper notice and dis
closure, should have been challenged at its inception. Recognizing
these concepts will serve to avoid the conceptual pitfalls and defini
tional uncertainties that often attend these issues.
33. 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1001.
34. 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1001.
35. 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1001. Unaccountably, he also concluded that the griev
ance was not a request for an advisory opinion.
36. Inasmuch as the grievance was denied, it is unclear whether the arbitrator considered
the grievances of the two bargaining-unit employees arbitrable or whether, instead, he was
focusing solely on the timeliness issues surrounding "union grievance." For purposes of this
discussion, however, one may assume he would have found the five-month-old event outside
the scope of the time limits.

